DePaul Journal of Art, Technology
& Intellectual Property Law
Volume 7
Issue 1 Fall 1996

Article 5

The Work for Hire Doctrine and the Second Circuit's Decision in
Carter v. Helmsley-Spear
Shannon M. Nolley

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip

Recommended Citation
Shannon M. Nolley, The Work for Hire Doctrine and the Second Circuit's Decision in Carter v. HelmsleySpear, 7 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 103 (1996)
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss1/5

This Case Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Digital
Commons@DePaul. It has been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property
Law by an authorized editor of Digital Commons@DePaul. For more information, please contact
digitalservices@depaul.edu.

Nolley: The Work for Hire Doctrine and the Second Circuit's Decision in C

CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS

The Work for Hire Doctrine and the Second Circuit's Decision
in Carter v. Helmsley-Spear
INTRODUCTION

Authorship is central to copyright protection. Theindentification of who can claim
authorship to a particular work determines what rights that author is entitled to in
relation to that work. Beyond the benefit of initial copyright ownership, authorship
also determines a copyright's duration, the owner's renewal rights, termination rights,
derivative rights, the right to import certain goods bearing the copyright, and most
recently, the rights of attribution and integrity.' Thus, the party with whom copyright
authorship vests acquires all rights and privileges related to the work. In order to
determine authorship, courts often employ the work for hire doctrine. As a result, the
doctrine has become a central element of debate among employers and artists.2 This
doctrine, as interpreted by the courts, determines who is the legal "author" of the
work.3 Generally, if the work is made in the course of the artist's employment, the
"authorship" is given to the employer If the work is not created during the course of
"employment," the artist is considered the "author."' What becomes problematic,
6
however, is determining what constitutes "employment."
In Part I, this comment examines the history of the Copyright Act of 1976 and how

1. Alexandra Duran, Communi for CreativeNon-Violence v. Reid: The Supreme Court
Reduces PredictabilitybyAttributing an Agency Standardto the WorkFor HireDoctrineof
the 1976 CopyrightAct, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 1081 (1990) (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 302(a),(b),

304(a), 203(a), 106(2), 601(bXl) (1978), and 106A (1991) respectively). The rights of
attribution and integrity were added with the adoption of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
(VARA), Pub. L. No. 101-650, §104 Stat. 5089, 5128, 1991 which became effective June 1,
1991.
2. Employers and artists are also referred to as "buyers" and "sellers" respectively. For a
discussion on the debates between these two parties. See generally, Duran, supra note 1; 17
U.S.C. §201 (a) & (b)
(1978); H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., §121, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
Code Cong. &Admin. News 5659, 5660; Nancy Barbara Morris, Communiyfor Creative
Non-Violence v. Reid: An Incomplete Resolution of the Workfor Hire Controversy,11 PACE
L..REv. 167 (1990); Charles D. Ossola, Recent Developments Relating to Copyright
Ownership & Transfer, 441 PLr/PAT 7 (1996); Julie Goldscheid, Copyright Law: Toward an
Improved "Works forHire" Doctrine,1990 ANN. Suav. AM. L. 557 (1991).
3. See supra note 2.
4. See supra note 2.
5. See supra note 2.
6. See supra note 2.
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the courts have interpreted the ambiguous language of the work for hire doctrine.7 Part
II examines the ruling of the Supreme Court in Communityfor CreativeNon-Violence
v. Reid,' which attempted to resolve the split in the circuits, and its prdgeny.
Additionally, Part II discusses the newest developments in copyright law, including
the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) of 1990, moral rights and VARA's impact on
the district court's interpretation of the work for hire doctrine in Carterv. HelmsleySpear,Inc." Part III examines the Second Circuit Court of Appeal's interpretation of
Carter" and the work for hire doctrine. Finally, Part IV of the comment discusses the
impact of the Second Circuit's decision on the future of VARA and the work for hire
doctrine.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The CopyrightAct of 1976
The Copyright Act of 19762 was the result of twenty years of debate and
compromise among authors, publishers, photographers, movie producers, and others
involved in industries utilizing copyrights. One of the key issues of debate was the
work for hire doctrine.'
Employers wanted Congress to follow the narrow
interpretation of authorship under the 1909 Copyright Act, allowing them a default
ownership in work for which they paid. 4 While, on the other hand, artists wanted a
broader definition that would better recognize the nature of their contracts with
sellers, contracts with independent contractors who were never "employees" in
realistic terms."

7. The "ambiguous" language oftheAct is a result of the Act's failure to define "employee"
or "scope ofemployment." 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (1978). See generally,Dumas v. Gommerman,
865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989); Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children and Adults of
Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises, 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987); Aldon Accessories Ltd.
v. Speigel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984).
8. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1989), aff'd,
490 U.S. 730, 109 S. Ct. 362 (1989).
9. Marco v. Accent Publishing Co., 969 F.2d 1547 (3d Cir. 1992); Aymes v. Bonelli Inc.,
980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992).
10. 861 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
11. 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995) cerL denied 64 U.S.L.W. 2372, (1996).
12. CopyrightAct of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553 (1976Xcodified at 17 U.S.C. §§101 - 810).
13. This paper will use "work for hire"interchangeably with the more cumbersome statutory
definition of"work made for hire." 17 U.S.C. §101 (1978).
14. See Marita Covarrubias, The Supreme CourtSculpts a Definition ... Is it a Workfor
Hire?, 10 Loy.ENT. L. J. 353,360-365 (1990). The 1909 Act provided that the copyright for
works for hire vested in the employer when the author produced the work while a salaried
employer. Independent artists were not considered employees per se under the 1909 Act.
However, the only provision which defines "author," states that it shall "include an employer
in the case of works made for hire." It did not further define "author," "employer" or "works
made for hire." 17 U.S.C. §26 (1909) (repealed 1976).
15. See Covarrubias, supra note 14 at 360-365.
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"The 1909 Copyright Act' did not contain a work made for hire provision. It
simply provided that the word "author" included an employer in the case of "works
made for hire."' 7 Unfortunately, "works made for hire" was undefined by the statute. 8
As a result, the key question for courts to answer became "whether independent
contractors could be considered statutory 'employees."" 9
The Second Circuit, the "de facto Copyright Court of the United States,""0
interpreted this language to be a presumption that the hiring party was entitled to the
copyright of the work created by both employees and independent contractors.2' Two
years before the adoption of the 1976 Act, the court held the work for hire doctrine is
applicable when the employee's work is produced at the instance and expense of the
employer. ' In other words, the artist is considered an employee when the motivating
factor in producing the work is the employer who initiates the creation.' These
cases,24 followed by other circuits, created an almost irrebuttable presumption that any
person who paid another to create a copyrightable work was the statutory "author"
under the work for hire doctrine.2' The buyer was thought to maintain the "right" to
control simply by paying for the work and having the power to refuse to accept it, even
if the buyer had no actual right to control the manner of the production of the work.26
After years of debate and compromise, the 1976 Copyright Act made the buyer the

16. 17 U.S.C. §§1 -26 (1909) (repealed 1976).
17. Maury Tepper, Works Madefor Hire and the CopyrightAct of 1976 - We'reFinally
Back Where We Started: Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct 2166

(1989), 59 U. CiN. L. Rnv. 299,302, (1990) (citing 17 U.S.C. §26 (1909Xrepealed 1976)).
18. Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children and Adults of Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy
Enterprises, 815 F.2d 323, 325 (5th Cir. 1987) (hereinafter "Easter Seals").
19. Id.
20. Id. The court probably referred to the Second Circuit as such because the Circuit served

as the primary source for interpretations of copyright issues prior to the enactment of the
CopyrightActof 1976. Covarrubias, supranote 14 at 379 n.61. See generallyPicture Music,
Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.denied,409 U.S. 997 (1972); Epoch
Producing Corp. v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 522 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1969), cert denied 424 U.S.
955 (1975), Donaldson Publishing Co. v. Bergman, Vocco & Conn, Inc., 375 F.2d 639 (2d Cir.
1967), cert denied, 389 U.S. 1036.
21. Tepper, supra note 17. See Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28 (2d Cir.
1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 686 (1940) (stating that a presumption exists that a patron who
solicits an artist to commission a work desires to control the publication of copies and the artist
consents unless otherwise stated in the contract); Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc. 457 F.2d
1213,1216-17 (2d Cir.), cert.denied,409 U.S. 997 (1972) (expanding presumption to apply
whenever a work was produced at the instance and expense of the hiring party, regardless of
whether he was an employer or a party commissioning an independent contractor); Brattleboro
Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding the
presumption of copyright ownership applied to both employers and parties who commissioned
independent contractors).
22. Siegel v. National Periodical Publications, Inc., 508 F.2d 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1974).
23. Id.
24. See supra, note 21.

25. EasterSeals, 815 F.2d 323,327 (5th Cir. 1987).
26. Id.
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"author" and initial owner if the work was made for hire. Section 201 provided :
(a) Initial Ownership -- Copyright in a work protected under this title vests
initially in the author or authors of the work. The authors of a joint work are
co-owners of copyright in the work.
(b) Works Made for Hire -- In the case of a work made for hire, the employer
or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for
purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise
in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in
the copyright.27
The Act then defined "work made for hire" in § 101 as:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a
collective work, as part of a motion picture of other audiovisual work, as a
translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional
text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as am atlas, if the parties
expressly agree in a written instrument
signed by them that the work shall be
28
considered a work made for hire....
The important change in the Act from prior interpretations of the work for hire
doctrine is the elimination of the presumption that the employer is the author."
Unfortunately, Congress, again, neglected to define key terms in the definition.3"
The terms "employee" and "scope of employment" are left to judicial interpretation.
"Although the language of the Act seems to distinguish between employee works in
subsection (1) and commissioned works in subsection (2), the distinction is not
explicit."3 For example, it is unclear whether all independent contractors are
"covered, if at all, by §101 (2) and its nine narrow categories." 2 Additionally, the
courts are left to interpret whether an "employee" in § 101 (1) is to be construed as a
formal employee, an "employee" under the expanded meaning of agency law, or an
"employee" under the "all-embracing scope of the 1909 Act."33 As a result of the
omission of these crucial definitions that left the determination of authorship muddled,
the courts filled the definitional void with a variety of conflicting interpretations.34

27. 17 U.S.C. §201 (a) & (b) (1978).
28. 17 U.S.C. §101 (1) & (2) (1978).
29. See generallyCorey L. Wishner, Whose Work is it Anyway?: Revisiting Communityfor
CreativeNon-Violence v. Reid in Defining the Employer-Employee Relationship Under the
"Work Madefor Hire" Doctrine, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L. J. 393 (Spring 1995); Morris, supra
note 2.
30. 17 U.S.C. §101(1X1978) simply defines a "work for hire" as "a work prepared by an
employee within the scope of his or her employment," but gives no guidance how to further
interpret the definition. See text accompanying note 28.
31. Morris, supra note 2, at 179.
32. EasterSeals, 815 F.2d 323,328 (5th Cir. 1987).
33. Id.
34. Duran, supra note 1, at 1081. See Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.
1989) (stating that §101 applies only to formal salaried employees); Easter Seal Society for
Crippled Children v. Playboy Enterprises, 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987) (using the "literal
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss1/5
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B. The Cases Priorto the Supreme Court Decision in Reid

Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Communityfor CreativeNon-Violence
v. Reid ," the courts were again left to define key elements of the work for hire
doctrine on an ad hoc basis. There are three cases considered pivotal in the
development of the doctrine prior to Reid."
1. Aldon AccessoriesLtd. v. Speigel,Inc.37
Aldon Accessories Ltd v. Speigel, Inc.3" involved a dispute over the copyright
ownership of statuettes created by an independent contractor under the direction of
Aldon Accessories. Aldon asserted that it had actively supervised and directed the
creation of the statuettes by telling the artists what to do with every pose, but Aldon
did not physically wield the sketching pen or sculpting tools.39 Aldon claimed that
statuettes offered by Speigel in its catalog infringed its copyright." The court held for
the plaintiffs, explaining the statuettes were the product of work for hire under the
1976 Copyright Act.41 The court reasoned that the statuettes were designed by artists
and artisans who were not regular employees of copyright holder, but who were
contractors operating under the supervision and direction of the copyright holder when
they designed the statuettes.42 Thus, the employer is the copyright holder of the work
if he has "actual control" over the work.43
The court interpreted the legislature's failure to define the words "employee" and
"scope of employment" in § 10 1(1) to indicate an intent to rely on the general law of
agency as applied by prior law." The court reasoned that Congress would not have
changed prior law so drastically without any discussion of that change in the legislative

interpretation" to determine whether an employer/employee relationship exists, looking to
agency law); Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopehas Publishing Co., 810 F.2d 410 (4th
Cir. 1987) (applying a supervision and control test); Evans Newton v. Chicago Systems
Software, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1986) (interpreting the work for hire using a "right to control"
test); Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Speigel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir 1984) cert. denied,469
U.S. 982 (1984) (establishing the "actual control" test to determine employer/employee
relationship)
35. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir 1989), affd, 490 U.S.
730, 109 S. Ct. 362 (1989).
36. See Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989); Easter Seal Society for
Crippled Children v. Playboy Enterprises, 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987); Aldon Accessories Ltd.
v. Speigel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir 1984) cert, denied 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
37.738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,469 U.S. 982 (1984) (hereinafter "Aldon").
38. Id.
39. Id.at 553.
40. Id.at 550-51.
41. Id.at 553.
42. AldonAccessories Ltd. v. Speigel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 553 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,469
U.S. 982 (1984).
43.Id.
44. Id.at 552 (noting the cases that followed the 1909 Act).
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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history." The court explained that it could find no indication that §101(2) was
intended to refer to contractors who were to be considered "employees" acting within
the scope of their employment.4 As a result, the court created three categories from
§101 (1) & (2). 47 It divided § 101(1) into two parts, one that applies to "formal"
employees, and a second that applies to independent contractors who are considered
"employees" acting within the "scope of their employment." 41 It read §101(2) as a
narrowing of the old doctrine with respect to formal independent contractors by
removing the presumption that the commissioner was the author of any work done for
hire. 49
The Seventh and Fourth Circuits followed Aldon, but altered the "actual control
test" by applying it in "cases with less compelling evidence that the hiring party has
asserted actual control"5" The Seventh Circuit changed the test to a "right to control"
test and suggested that an employer/employee relationship may exist where the
employer could have controlled the work but chose not to." The Fourth Circuit
explained there can be no employer/employee relationship where there has been no
supervision or direction in the manner of the work's completion and where the
contractor has not signed a written agreement giving copyright ownership to the
commissioner. 2 The court concluded that the issue was whether the defendant was
sufficiently directed and supervised to be considered an employee. 3
2. EasterSeal Societyfor Crippled Children

4

The second "famous" case prior to Reid was the Fifth Circuit's decision in Easter
Seal Society for Crippled Children and Adults of Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy
Enterprises.5 In this case, the Easter Seal Society ("Easter Seals") sued Playboy
Enterprises and a local public television station for Playboy's use of film clips that had
45. Id.
46. Covarrubias, supra note 14, at 365 (citingAldon, 738 F.2d 548, 552 (2d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied,469 U.S. 982 (1984)).
47. It effectively divided § 101 as follows;
(1) (a) formal employees acting within the scope of their
employment
(b) independent contractors considered employees acting within the
scope of their employment
(2) independent contractors and commissioned works.
48. SeeAldon, 738 F.2d at 552 -53.
49. See Aldon, 738 F.2d at 552-53; See also Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children v.
Playboy Enterprises, 815 F.2d 323,332 (5th Cir. 1987).
50. Covarrubias, supra note 14, at 367. See generallyBrunswick Beacon, Inc. v. SchockHopchas Publishing Co., 810 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1987); Evans Newton v. Chicago Systems
Software, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1986).
51. EvansNewton, 793 F.2d at 894.
52. BrunswickBeacon, Inc., 810 F.2d at 413-14.
53. Id.
54. 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987).
55. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss1/5
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been originally shot by the television station for Easter Seal's use.56 Easter Seals had
contracted with the station to shoot footage of a staged Mardi Gras-style parade and
musical jam session to be broadcast during its National Easter Seal Telethon. 7 Some
time later, the station's director of broadcasting received a request from a Canadian
television producer for Mardi Gras parade footage.58 The station director sent forty
minutes of tape copied from the field tapes.59 Portions of this tape were used in an
"adult" film entitled "Candy, the Stripper. " '° The tape was shown a total of four times
in a period of two days, during which one or more viewers in the New Orleans area
recognized themselves in the field footage now part of "Candy."' Although no
discussion of copyright had occurred between Easter Seals and the television station
prior to the first videotaping Easter Seals argued that it acquired copyright ownership
of the film because it was shot "for hire." The court held for the defendants and
explained that because the television station was an independent contractor, the Easter
Seal Society was not the statutory "author."62 Therefore, the use of the field tapes in
"Candy, the Stripper" could not have infringed on the Society's rights.63 The court
created a bright line rule for determining whether a work was made for hire under the
1976 Act by holding that "[o]nly works by actual employees and independent
contractors who fulfill the requirement of §101 (2) can be 'for hire' under the new
statute. Copyright 'employees' are those persons called 'employees' or 'servants' for
purposes of agency law.""
Unlike the Second Circuit, the court in EasterSeals found that Congress did intend,
in the 1976 Act, to change the work for hire status of commissioned words under the
1909 Act.65 The court explained that "a work is 'made for hire' within the meaning
of the Copyright Act of 1976 if and only if the seller is an employee within the
meaning of agency law, or the buyer and seller comply with the requirements of
§101(2)."" The court called its reasoning the "literal interpretation" of the Act.67 In
applying this test, a court would first determine whether or not the seller is an

56. Professor Alan Hyde & Christopher W. Hager, Promotingthe CopyrightAct's CreatorFavoringPresumption:"WorksMadeforHire" underAymes v. Bonelli &Avtec Systems, Inc.
v. Peiffer, 71 DENV. U. L. Rnv. 693,703 (1994) (citing815 F.2d at 324-25).
57. 815 F.2dat324.
58. Id.
59. Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children v. Playboy Enterprises, 815 F.2d 323,323 (5th
Cir. 1987). A field tape is the unedited tape of the event.
60. Id. at 324-25.
61. Id. at 325.
62. 815 F.2d at 337.
63. Id.
64. Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children v. Playboy Enterprises, 815 F.2d 323,337 (5th
Cir. 1987).
65. "We are convinced that Congress meant to alter the status of commissioned works,
which means that itmeant to alter the 'work for hire' doctrine under the 1909 Act. The problem
is figuring out the precise contours of the intended alteration." Id.at 331.
66. Id. at334.
67. 815 F.2d at 329.
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employee or an independent contractor, using agency law rules.68 Then, the court
would apply the statute.' It specifically divided §101 (1) & (2), asserting that they are
distinct and uninterchangeable rules.71 The court reasoned:
Section 101(1) applies to sellers who are employees. If the work was in the
scope of employment, an agency-law employee is a copyright employee, and
the employer is the 'author.' Section 101(2) apples to independent
contractors. All works by independent contractors -- 'works specially
ordered or commissioned' -- are not works for hire unless the work comes
within the 7nine narrow statutory categories and parties agree in a signed
instrument. '
Thus, if an independent contractor's work does not make him an"employee" within
the bounds of agency law, the contractor - not the employer - is considered the author
and therefore, the copyright holder. If, however, this independent contractor's work
is for use as one of the nine categories of §101 (2),72 the employer is considered the
author unless the parties have explicitly provided otherwise in writing.
In deciding to adopt the "literal interpretation" approach, the Fifth Circuit also
evaluated two other types of reasoning: (1) the "conservative interpretation "' 73 and (2)

68. The RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY §220(2) (1958) provides several parameters
for determining employee status. Note, "servant" is synonymous with "employee" for the
purposes of agency law.
In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor, the
following matters of fact, among others, are considered:
(a) the extent ofcontrol which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the detail of
the work,
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;
(c)the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done
under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place
of work for the person doing the work;
(f)the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the employer,
(i)whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant;
(j)whether the principal is or is not in business.
69. Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children v. Playboy Enterprises, 815 F.2d 323, 329 (5th
Cir. 1987).
70. Id.
71. Id.

72. 17 U.S.C. §101(2X1978) provides that a work for hire is a work specially ordered or
commissioned for use as (1) a contribution to a collective work, (2) as part of a motion picture
of other audiovisual work, (3) as a translation, (4) as a supplementary work, (5) as a
compilation, (6) as an instructional text, (7) as a test, (8) as answer material for a test, (9) or as
an atlas, ifthe parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall
be considered a work made for hire. EasterSeals, 815 F.2d at 328 (numbers added).
73. Id. at 329.
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the "Aldon Accessories compromise."74 The court stated under the "conservative
interpretation" that it does not matter whether the seller is a formal employee or an
independent contractor.75 Under such an analysis, the court "disregards the
employee/independent contractor relationship and utilizes a 'right to control'
standard." 6 This approach follows a "traditional" analysis for § 101(1), asserting that
if the work was undertaken at the instance and expense of the buyer, and if the buyer
had the right to control the work, regardless of whether or not the right was exercised,
then the seller was a legal employee." Thus, if the work was "commissioned and the
buyer had the right to control, then the seller was an employee under §101(1).""T
If the buyer would prevail under this analysis, the court would then seek to
determine if the disputed work falls within the nine categories codified in §101 (2).
Under the "conservative" view of the statute, the seller would be afforded "special
protection."" The EasterSeals court was critical of this approach because it felt that
it did not comport with legislative intent to more closely define the work for hire
doctrine.' In fact, the court said that this approach made "the nine narrow categories
of § 101 (2) completely mysterious."'" The court questioned why an author of "answer
material for a test" would get special protection from the traditional expansive "work
for hire" doctrine when a musician or sculptor would not.' The court stated that "it
would be anomalous to give these activities special protections beyond those accorded
other types of commissioned works."' The court noted, however, the difficulty of
determining "the precise contours of the intended alteration."84
The final interpretation considered by the Easter Seals court was the "Aldon
Accessories compromise." 5 The Fifth Circuit examined the Second Circuit's
reasoning behind the "actual control" test inAldon v. Speigel and summarized the
Aldon court's test, as follows: is the contractor 'independent' or is "the contractor so
controlled and supervised in the creation of the particular work that an employeremployee relationship exists."' The Aldon court's decision was a compromise
because while it recognized the dichotomy between employees and independent
contractors, unlike the "conservative interpretation," it limited the employer's
74. Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children v. Playboy Enterprises, 815 F.2d 323, 329 (5th
Cir. 1987).
75. Id. at 331.
76. Morris, supra note 2 at 184.
77. 815 F.2d at331.
78. Morris, supra note 2 at 184.
79. Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children v. Playboy Enterprises, 815 F.2d 323, 331 (5th
Cir. 1987).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. EasterSeal Societyfor CrippledChildren, 815 F.2d at 331.
85. Id.
86. 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,469 U.S. 982 (1984).
87. EasterSeals,815 F.2d at 332 (citingAldon, 738 F.2d at 551).
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authorship by requiring that there be "actual control."88
The Fifth Circuit strongly disagreed with the Aldon decision and detailed the
following four problems with the "actual control" test: (1) the rule is unnecessary in
cases where "work for hire" is raised by the defendant to question the validity of the
plaintiff's copyright since any plaintiff who actual controls an independent contractor
will the a co-author of the work; (2) it makes the outcome of "work for hire" analysis
too fact-specific for each work and therefore is less predictable by buyers and sellers;
(3) it does not eliminate the need for a determination of employee versus independent
contractor since the "actual control" test applies only to independent contractors; (4)
it slides to easily into the vague and expansive "right to control" test.' The Easter
Seals court concluded that the "Aldon compromise" was more an interpolation of the
statute than an interpretation of it." In addition, the Fifth Circuit urged that this
interpolation of the statute was an "insurmountable" problem because there "is simply
no way to milk the 'actual control' test of Aldon Accessories from the language of the
statute."9 '
As a result of the shortcomings of the "conservative interpretation" and the "Aldon
Accessories compromise," the Easter Seals court held that the "literal interpretation"
was the more reasonable test' The "literal interpretation" test (1) makes sense out of
the nine narrow categories in §101(2); (2) ties the meaning of "work for hire" to a
well-developed doctrine in agency law; (3) affords buyers and sellers the greatest
predictability; and (4) creates a moral symmetry between agency law and copyright
law.93
3. Dumas v. Gommerman"'
Despite the Fifth Circuit's assertions that its test was the most reasonable, the test
was not followed by the Ninth Circuit in the next major "work-for-hire" case. Dumas
v. Gommerman3 articulated a third view of the work for hire doctrine, asserting that
only works of formal, salaried employees are covered by § 101 (1).96
In Dumas, the widow and representative of the estate of graphic artist Patrick
Nagel brought suit against Stefan Gommerman, a Los Angeles art gallery owner." The
suit alleged copyright infringement of lithographs that Nagel had produced for ITT

88. Morris, supra note 2 at 185.
89. Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children v. Playboy Enterprises, 815 F.2d 323,334 (5th
Cir. 1987).
90. Id.at 331.
91. Morris, supra note 2 at 185 (citingEasterSeals, 815 F.2d at 334).
92. Id. at 334.
93. EasterSeals,815 F.2d at 335.
94. Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989).
95. Id.
96. Id.at 1105.
97. Id.at 1094.
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Cannon."' Nagel had been commissioned by ITT Cannon in 1979." The agreement
was made to create four works of art as part of a promotional campaign through a
purchase order which did not specify that the works were works for hire or that the
copyright was transferred to ITT Cannon."° As a result of the failure of the
promotional giveaway, ITT Cannon was left with several extra sets of lithographs.0 1
Several years later Gommerman learned of the existence of these lithographs and in
02
1985 purchased the remaining sets and copyrights to the works from ITT Cannon.1
03
In January 1986, Gommerman registered each of the four works in his name. After
Dumas learned of the purported copyright transfer she notified Gommerman and ITT
Cannon of her claim of copyright ownership, and filed a conflicting registration of
copyright in 1987.10' Dumas contended that Nagel, as an independent contractor, was
the author of the ITT works." 5 Under the 1976 Copyright Act, Nagel retained
ownership of the copyrights and as the successor in interest, Dumas was entitled to
6
damages and declaratory relief for copyright infringement."
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the granting of the preliminary
injunction of the District Court and concluded that Nagel was not an "employee" of
ITT for the purpose of §101 (1). 7 Since the ITT works did not meet the requirements
of a commissioned work under § 101 (2) the lithographs were not "works made for
hire.""'° In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit looked to the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Easter Seals and the legislative history of the 1976 Act, for guidance."
The court found that §101(1) covered only "formal, salaried employees" while
§101(2) encompassed "only certain types of specially commissioned works."" 0.. In
rejecting the proposition that independent contractors could be covered by § 101 (1),
the court asserted that the drafters intended to create a bright line between employees
and independent contractors."' The Dumas court said that "[w]here the artist holds
himself or herself out as a freelancer, the employer should anticipate that the
commissioned work will not be a work for hire under §101(l)...... When the
relationship between the parties is ambiguous, however, the court suggested the
following factors would be relevant in determining the employee or independent
contractor status: (1) whether the artist worked in his or her own studio or on the

98. Hyde & Hager, supra note 56 (citingDumas, 865 F.2d at 1094).
99. Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1094 (9th Cir. 1989).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1094-95 (9th Cir. 1989).
105. Id. at 1095.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1105.
108. Id. at 1105.
109. Id. at 1096-1105 (9th Cir. 1989).
110. Hyde &Hager, supra note 55 at 705-6 (citingDumas, 865 F.2d at 1098 - 1105).
111. Morris, supra note 2 at 187 (citingDumas, 865 F.2d at 1104).
112. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1105.
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premises of the buyer; (2) whether the buyer is in the regular business of creating
works of the type purchased; (3) whether the artist works for several buyers at a time,
or exclusively for one; (4) whether the buyer retains authority to assign additional
projects to the artist; (5) the tax treatment of the relationship by the parties; (6)
whether the artist is hired through the channels the buyer customarily uses for hiring
new employees; (7) whether the artist is paid a salary or wages, or is paid a flat fee;
and (8) whether the artist
obtains from the buyer all benefits customarily extended to
3
is regular employees."
Several of these factors are rooted in agency law and were referenced from the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia decision in Communityfor
CreativeNon-Violence ("CCNV") v. Reid."4 The Dumas court, however, stressed
that these factors
were only to be used when the relationship between the parties was
5
ambiguous.1
The varying decisions in Aldon, EasterSeals, and Dumas are demonstrative of
the division among the circuits in interpreting the ambiguous language of the work for
hire doctrine under the 1976 Copyright Act. The Fifth and District of Columbia
Circuits favored a literal interpretation of the Act, while the Second, Fourth, and
Seventh Circuits chose a supervision and control standard, and the Ninth Circuit
followed a formal, salaried approach." 6 Recognizing this split among the circuits, the
Supreme Court granted "CCNV"'s petition for certiorari to resolve this conflict." 7
C. Communit for CreativeNon-Violence v. Reid"'
In 1985, the Community for Creative Non-Violence ("CCNV'), a Washington,
D.C. organization dedicated to eliminating homelessness, entered into an oral
agreement with Reid, a sculptor, to create a statue dramatizing the plight of the
homeless." 9 This statue was intended for display at the 1985 Christmas pageant in
Washington. 2 Aside from receiving design instruction and occasional physical
assistance from CCNV funded workers, Reid created the statue in his studio and did
not use CCNV facilities.'' When Reid finished the statue he delivered it for the
pageant.12 After, the statue was returned to Reid following the pageant for minor
repairs; following the repairs, however, Reid refused to return the statue to CCNV
because he believed that its physical composition could not endure the nationwide tour

113. Morris, supra note 2 at 188 (citingDumas,865 F.2d at 1105).
114. Community for CreaiveNon-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir 1989), afd,
490 U.S. 730 (1989).
115. Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989).
116. Morris, supra note 2 at 189.
117. Id.
118. Reid, 490 U.S. 730.
119. Community for CreativeNon-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir 1989), aff'd,
490 U.S. 730,733 (1989).
120. Id. at 730, 733.
121. Hyde & Hager, supra note 56 at 706 (citingReid,490 U.S. at 734,752.)
122. Reid, 490 U.S. at 735.
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planned by CCNV.'" Both parties, who had never discussed copyright ownership of
the sculpture, then filed competing copyright registration certificates.124 CCNV filed
suit to determine the legal owner of the statue's copyright."
The District Court for the District of Columbia ruled for CCNV and held that the
statue was a "work made for hire" as defined in the Copyright Act of 1976.126 The
court reasoned that because §201 (b) 27 vests copyright ownership of works for hire in
the employer or other person for whom the work is prepared, unless there is a written
agreement to the contrary, the statue was owned exclusively by CCNV."'
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district
court's decision and adopted the "literal interpretation" of the Fifth Circuit." 9 The
court concluded that a copyrightable work of an independent contractor cannot be a
work for hire under the Act unless it falls into one of the enumerated categories of
section 101 (2) and the parties agree in writing that the work is to be a work for hire. 3
Ruling in Reid's favor, the Court held: (1) Reid was an independent contractor under
the rules of agency law, and (2) that the statue did not satisfy § 101 (2) definition, since
sculpture is not one of the nine categories of "specially ordered or commissioned"
works contemplated by the statute.' Additionally, the parties had not agreed in
writing that the sculpture would be a work for hire.'32
The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision, after weighing all the
relevant factors, and holding that Reid was not an employee but an independent
contractor. 33 As a result, the statue was not a work made for hire and he was merely
the statutory "author" of the work.33 The first part of the Court's analysis was to
define "a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment"
under § 101(1).13' To define the terms "employee" and "scope of employment," are
not defined in the Act, the Court stated that "where Congress uses terms that have

123. Id.
124. Community for CreativeNon-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir 1989), aff'd,
490 U.S. 730,730,734,735 (1989).
125. Id. at 735.
126. Id.
127. §201 (b) states:
Works Made for Hire. - In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this
title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument
signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.
17 U.S.C. §210(b) (1978).
128. Reid, 490 U.S. at 735-36 (citing17 U.S.C. §§ 101, and §201(b) (1978)).
129. Morris, supra note 2 at 188-89 (citingCommunity for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir 1989), aff'd,490 U.S. 730,736 (1989)).
130. Reid, 490 U.S. at 736 (citing 17 U.S.C. §101(2) (1978)).
131. Reid, 490 U.S. at 736.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 736, 752.
134. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir 1989), aff'd,
490 U.S. 730,752 -53 (1989).
135. Id. at 738.
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accumulated settled meaning under... the common law, a court must infer, unless the
statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning
of these terms."' 136 The Court determined that Congress intended these terms to
describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law
agency doctrine.'37 The Court noted that Congress' intent to incorporate agency law
is suggested by § 101 (1)'s use of the term, "scope of employment," a widely used term
of art in agency law.' Establishment of a federal rule of agency, rather than reliance
on state agency law, is particularly appropriate when considering the Act's express
objective of creating a national, uniform copyright law.'39 As a result, the Court agreed
with the court of appeals that the term "employee" should be understood in light of the
general common law of agency. 4'
The Court rejected the "control" tests of the Second, Seventh, and Fourth Circuits
and asserted that "importing a test based on a hiring party's right to control, or actual
control of, a product would unravel the 'carefully worked out compromise aimed at
balancing legitimate interests on both sides."" 4' The factors that the Reid Court used
to determine whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of
agency included but were not limited to:
(1) the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the
product is accomplished;
(2) the skill required;
(3) the source of the instrumentalities and tools;
(4) the location of the work;
(5) the duration of the relationship between the parties;
(6) whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the
hired party;
(7) the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to
work;
(8) the method of payment;
(9) the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants;
(10) whether the work is part of the regular business of the
hiring party;
(11) whether the hiring party is in business;

136. Id.at 739 (citingNLRB v. Amax Coal Co. 453 U.S. 322,329, 101 S. Ct. 2789,2794
(1981)).
137. Reid, 490 U.S. at 740. See e.g., Kelly v. Southern Pacific Co., 419 U.S. 318,322-23,
95 S.Ct 472, 475-76, 42 L.Ed2d 498 (1974); Baker v. Texas & Pacific R. Co., 359 U.S. 227,
228,79 S. Ct. 664,665,3 L.Ed.2d 756 (1959) (per curiam); Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio R.
Co., 237 U.S. 84, 94,35 S. Ct. 491,494, 59 L.Ed. 849 (1915).
138. Reid, 490 U.S. at 740. See, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY §228 (1958).
139. Community for CreativeNon-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir 1989), aff'd,
490 U.S. 730,740 (1989).

140. Id.
141. Id. at 739,748,750 (citingH.R. REP. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2nd. Sess. 114(1966)

(quoting Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the
U.S. Copyright Law: 1965 Revision Bill, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., Copyright Law Revision, pt.
6,66 (Comm. Print 1965))).
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(12) the provision of employee benefits;
42
(13) and the tax treatment of the hired party'
This list is modeled from the provisions in the Restatement (Second) of Agency.' 43
The Court said that no one of these factors is dispositive, but are to be applied to the
relevant facts of the case and then weighed to determine whether or an employment
relationship existed.'44
The Supreme Court also rejected the formal, salaried employee interpretation of
the Ninth Circuit stating that, "[w]hile there is some support for such a definition in
the legislative history... [t]he Act does not say 'formal' or 'salaried' employee, but
simply 'employee' ... [e]ven the one court of appeals, to adopt what it termed a
formal, salaried employee test, in fact embraced an approach incorporating numerous
14
factors drawn from the agency law definition of employee which we endorse." 1
A court first should ascertain whether the work was prepared by an employee or
an independent contractor, using the principles of general common law of agency, to
determine whether a work is for hire under the Act." 6 After making this
determination, the court can apply the appropriate subsection of §101."' Thus, the
"literal interpretation" of the Fifth Circuit and the appellate court below seemingly
became the new yardstick in work for hire cases.'48
D. The CasesFollowingReid
The cases that have following Reid have further defined the factors enumerated by
the Supreme Court. The Third and the Second Circuits have each decided a key case
in the interpretation of Reid.
1. Marco v. Accent PublishingCompany'

49

InMarco,the Third Circuit held that a freelance photographer was an independent
contractor after it weighed the Reid factors to and concluded the work was for hire
under §101(1) and §101(2).'5o Marco was hired to photograph jewelry for Accent

142. Reid, 490 U.S. at 741 -42. See, Wishner supranote 29, at 398-414 (discussing the
Reid factors).
143. Reid, 490 U.S. at 753. See supra note 68 for list of parameters defined in
220(2) (1958).
144. Community for CreativeNon-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir 1989), aff'd,

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY §

490 U.S. 730,752 (1989).
145. Id. at 743, n.8.
146. Id.at 751.
147. Id.
148. This decision is seen by some scholars as another compromise between competing
interests, similar to the Copyright Act of 1976. See, Tepper, supra note 17; Morris, supra note
2.
149. Marco v. Accent Publishing Co., 969 F.2d 1547 (3d Cir. 1992).
150. Id. at 1550 -52.
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Magazine's monthly rade journal for the costume jewelry industry.' Accent supplied
the jewelry and props, sketched the shots, and retained the right to have unsatisfactory
shots redone.' Marco worked independently in his studio, subject to Accent's
deadlines.' On several occasions Accent's art director would pose live models
supplied by Accent'54 After a dispute arose as to copyright ownership, Marco moved
for a preliminary injunction to prevent Accent from reproducing his photographs. The
district court found that Accent's art director had sufficiently directed, supervised, and
provided artistic contribution to the photographic work, and denied the injunction.'55
Circuit, however, vacated the district court's
The Court of Appeals for the Third
56
decision and remanded the case.
The appeals court held that "a magazine publisher's regular practice of
commissioning photographs of its own conception does not create an employment
relationship with an experienced photographer who uses his own equipment; who
works at his own studio, on days and times of his choosing, without photography
assistants hired by the publisher; and who receives payment without income tax
withheld, without employee benefits, for discrete assignments rather than for hourly
or periodic work."'5 7
Moreover, the court added three additional factors to the 13 delineated in Reid. 8
Using the Restatement (Second) of Agency, it added the "hired party's occupation,"
"local custom," and "actual control over the details of the work.' 159 The court
recognized that Reid did not say considering "actual control" was erroneous, but
merely that it was not dispositive in the determination of an employment
relationship."'
2. Aymes v. Bonelli16'
Another notable case to followReidcame from the Second Circuit in the 1992 case
of Aymes v. Bonelli. Like the Third Circuit, the Aymes court also held that the
plaintiff, a computer programmer, was an independent contractor after conducting a
Reid analysis.'62 In 1980 Aymes was hired to create a computer program by the
defendant, Bonelli, the president and chief executive officer of Island, a retail store
Id. at 1548.
Id.
Id. at 1549.
Marco v. Accent Publishing Co., 969 F.2d 1547, 1549 (3d Cir. 1992).
Id.
Id. at 1553.
Id. at 1552.
Wishner, supra note 29, at 403.
Marco v. Accent Publishing Co., 969 F.2d 1547, 1550 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing
RESTATENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §220(2) (b) & (c) respectively).
160. Marco,969 F.2d. at 1550 (citingCommunity for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846
F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir 1989), affid, 490 U.S. 730,752 (1989)).
161. Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992).
162. Id. at 864.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
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selling swimming pools.163 During the two years that Aymes worked for Bonelli, he
created a series of programs called "CSALIB" which maintained receipt records,
In September 1982,
inventory, sales figures an other accounting information.'
Aymes left Island when Bonelli decided to cut Aymes's hours.'65 Bonelli refused to
pay Aymes his $14,560 in back pay and for the use of CSALIB, unless Aymes signed
a release of his rights to CSALIB.' Aymes refused and instead registered CSALIB
67
with the copyright office and filed suit against Bonelli for copyright infringement.1
The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision and held that it
erroneously misapplied the law." The appeals court asserted that the Reid factors
"should not merely be tallied but should be weighed according to their significance in
the case."' 69 The Third Circuit elaborated that in "virtually every situation" the
following factors would be significant: (1) the hiring party's right to control the
manner and means of creation; (2) the skill required; (3) the provision of employee
benefits; (4) the tax treatment of the hired party; and (5) whether the hiring party has
the right to assign additional projects to the hired party. 7 These factors should be
given more weight in the analysis because7 they are usually highly probative of the true
nature of the employment relationship.1 1
When it seemed that the courts finally resolved the work for hire debate, Congress
enacted an amendment to the Copyright Act of 1976.17 This amendment, though long
awaited, has further muddled interpretations of a work made for hire.
E. The VisualArtistsRights Act ("VARA ") of 1990Y73
In 1990, Congress passed VARA in an attempt to align with the international
community and conform to the guidelines set forth in the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. 74 The United States has long avoided to

163. Id. at 859.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 859 (2d Cir. 1992).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 861 - 862.
169. Id. at 861.
170. Id. .
171. Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992).
172. 17 U.S.C. (1978).
173. 17 U.S.C. §101 (1992).
174. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(1988).
There are two fundamental principles established by the 1886 Convention:
(1) All signatories to the Convention will operate as a single cooperative union;
(2) Each member state will abide by the rule of "national treatment," where an author is
granted in any other member state the same copyright protection for his or her work as that
particular member state accords its own authors.
Marko IglendzaMoralRightsProtection under the VisualArtistsRights Act of 1990: The
JudicialInterpretationin Carterv. Helmsley-Spear, 5 DEPAUL-L A J.ART &ENT. L. 187, 189
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joining the Convention because it believed that the Convention's protection of "moral
rights""' was inconsistent with U.S. Copyright lawsY76 The term "moral rights" is
meant to capture those rights of a spiritual, non-economic and personal nature.' 77 The
rights spring from a belief that an artist in the process of creation injects his spirit into
the work and that the artist's personality, as well as the integrity of the work, would
therefore be protected and preserved. 7 U.S. copyright law has been exclusively
motivated by the benefit which the public is to derive.' 79 This is contrary to the notion
of moral rights, however, which are designed primarily to vindicate the artist's
individual rights, while the public derives secondary benefits from the recognition of
the artist's rights.' The common belief in the United States was that existing federal
and state statutes, as well as common law principles of defamation,' invasion of
privacy," and contract law" adequately provided the necessary protections for moral
rights.'
In the past, the U.S. attempted to assert its influence in copyright protection on the
international community through the Universal Copyright Convention ("UCC"),
administered by the United National Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
C'UNESCO").' g In 1984, however, the U.S. left UNESCO and, as a result, could no
longer exert much influence over other countries under the UCC.' 6 The United States
instead joined the Berne Convention to protect U.S. intellectual property interests
.internationally, to ensure an advantageous position for itself in the global market, and
to establish a negotiating platform from whence it could influence future international

(Winter 1994/Spring 1995Xciting, H.R. REP. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1988)).
The 1928 revision to the Convention established a third principle. Under Article 6bis, the
moral rights of attribution and integrity are recognized. Under this principle, authors not only
have the right to claim authorship of a work, they also have the right to object to modifications
of the work which prejudice their honor or reputation. Id.
175. Moral rights are also known as "droit moral," from the French phrase "droit d'auteur"
or author's rights. Stephen Fraser, Berne, C-TA, NAFTA & GATT': The Implication of
CopyrightDroitMoral andCulturalExemptions in InternationalTrade Law, 18 HASTINGS
CoMM/ENrL. J.287,290 (Winter 1996).
176. Id. at 296.
177. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, 71 F.2d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995).
178. Id.
179. Patty Gerstenblith, Architect asArtist: Artists'Rightsand HistoricPreservation,12
CARDozoART&ENT.L.J. 431,439 (1994).
180. Id.
181. Iglendza supranote 174, at 190 n19.
182. Id. at 190 n20.
183. Id. at 190 n2l. In his articleIglendza argues that contract law has been unsatisfactory
as a common law cause of action to protect an artist's moral rights as a result of unequal

bargaining power. Id.
184. Id. at 189.
185. Fraser, supranote 175, at 296.
186. Id.
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copyright policy.'87
By adopting the VARA, Congress amended the Copyright Act of 1976 to include
§106A which provides authors with the rights of attribution and integrity.'1 The right
of attribution includes the right to claim authorship of a work and the right to prevent
the use of the artist's name as the author of a work not created by that artist." The
right of integrity can be divided into two separate prongs.'90 The first prong gives an
author the right to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of the
work that is prejudicial to the author's honor or reputation.' 9' This alteration must be
both prejudicial and intentional." The second prong of the right of integrity allows the
author to prevent the destruction of work of recognized stature."
Since the VARA's enaction in 1990, however, there has been little case law
following it. The first case to interpret VARA was the District Court for the Southern
District of New York's 1994 decision in Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc.9 4 The
187. Iglendza, supra note 174 at 188 - 89. See also, William Belanger, U.S. Compliance
with the Berne Convention, 3 GEO. MAsON INDEPENDENT L. REv. 373 (Summer 1995).

188. 17 U.S.C. 106A provides, in a relevant part:
(a) Rights of attribution and integrity - subject to section 107 and independent of the
exclusive rights provided in section 106, the author of a work of visual art (1) shall have the right (A) to claim authorship of that work, and
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of
visual art which he or she did not create;
(2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the work
ofvisual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work
which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation...
17 U.S.C §101 defines "a work of visual art" as (1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited
edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the
author, or, in the case ofa sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures
of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature
or other identifying mark of the author, or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in a
single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer
that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author.
It also provides that a "work of visual art" does not include (AXi) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art,
motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, newspaper, periodical,
data base, electronic information service, electronic publication, or similar publication;
...(B) any work made for hire... (emphasis added).
189. 17 U.S.C. §106A(l); see supranote 188.
190. Iglendza, supra note 174 at 194, citing 17 U.S.C. §106A(2); see supra note 188.
191. Iglendza, supra note 174 at 194.
192. Id.

193. Id.
194. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, 861 F.Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). See Iglendza, supra note
174 for a full examination of the district court's decision based on VARA.
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district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and held that under VARA, the artists were
entitled to an injunction against the removal of their work from the defendant's
building.' Initially, the court determined that the statue was a "work of visual art" as
defined by §106A and the definitions set forth in §101.
Since a "work made for
hire" is an exception to this rule, the court then had to determine whether or not the
work was made for hire under §§ 101(1) & (2).' If the court had determined that the
statue was a work for hire, VARA would not be applicable and the defendants would
be considered the author of the work. However, after weighing the factors according
to the Reidtest, the court concluded that the statue was not a work for hire and that the
plaintiffs were independent contractors. As a result, the court applied § 106A to
determine the extent of protection and the remedies afforded to the plaintiffs. 9
On appeal, however, the "de facto copyright court" reversed the district court's
decision. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the weight the lower
court had given to the relevant Reid factors, holding that the plaintiffs were employees
ofthe defendant and that the statue was a work made for hire, which exempts it from
protection under VARA.'
II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN CARTER V.HEwusLEYSPEAR
A. Facts
Plaintiffs, John Carter, John Swing, and John Veronis are professional sculptors
who work together and are known collectively as the "Three-J's" or "W." 200
Defendants, 474431 Associates ("Associates") and Hehnsley-Spear, Inc. are the
owner and managing agent respectively,
of a commercial building located at 47-44
201
31 st Street in Queens, New York.
In February of 1990, Associates entered into a 48 year lease with 47-44 31 st Street
Associates, L.P. ("Limited Partnership") whose employed SIG Management Company
("SIG") to manage the building.' In December of 1991, SIG entered into a one-year
agreement with the plaintiffs. 3 In the agreement, the plaintiffs were to "design, create
and install sculpture and other permanent installations in the building, primarily the
lobby."" 4 Under the agreement, the plaintiffs had "full authority in design, color and
style" of the art work to be installed, while SIG retained the authority to direct the

195. Carter,861 F.Supp. at 329.
196. Id. at 313 - 16.
197. Id. at316 -22.
198. Id. at322 -29.
199. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, 71 F.3d 77, 87 (2d Cir. 1995) cert. denied 64 U.S.L.W.
2372,37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020.
200. Id. at 80.
201. Id. at 79 - 80.
202. Id.at 80.
203. Id.at 80.
204. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, 71 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1995) cert. denied 64 U.S.L.W.
2372,37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss1/5
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location of the installation of the artwork within the building. 5 The plaintiffs were
to retain ownership of the copyright to their work, and SIG was to receive fifty percent
of the proceeds from any exploitation. "° In January 1993, SIG and the plaintiffs
signed an agreement extending the contract for an additional year." 7 In December
1993, however, Corporate Life took over as manager
and assumed the agreement with
28
the plaintiffs, again extending the contract.
The artwork that is the subject of this litigation is a very large "walk-through
sculpture" occupying most, but not all, of the building's lobby. 209 The artwork
consists of a variety of cultural elements constructed from recycled material, much of
it metal, affixed to the walls and ceiling, and a vast mosaic made from pieces of
recycled glass embedded in the floor and walls. 210 Elements of the work include a
giant hand fashioned from an old school bus, a face made of automobile parts, and a
number of interactive components.2" ' These assorted elements make
up a theme
212
relating to environmental concerns and the significance of recycling.
In April 1994, Limited Partnership filed for bankruptcy and the original lease was
terminated, surrendering the property to the defendant owners." 3 It was then that
14
defendant, Helnsley-Spear, became the new managing agent of the building.
Representatives of defendants informed the artists that they could no longer continue
to install artwork at the property, and instead had to vacate the building. 2 5
Additionally, these representatives made statements indicating that the defendants
216
intended to remove the art work already in place in the building's lobby.
Consequently, the plaintiffs brought this action under VARA, seeking a permanent
injunction to prevent Helmsley-Spear from altering or destroying the art work in the
lobby. 217

B. The Court'sAnalysis
The Second Circuit agreed with the District Court's interpretation of the sculpture
as a "work of visual art' under VARA. Evaluating the District Court's interpretation
of the facts under the requisite "clearly erroneous" standard, the Court of Appeals

205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.

208. Id.
209. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, 71 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1995) cert. denied 64 U.S.L.W.

2372,37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 80 - 81.

214. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995) cert. denied 64 U.S.L.W.
2372,37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020.

215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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affirmed the District Court's finding that the artists created a "thematically consistent
inter-related work whose elements could not be separated without losing continuity
and meaning," thus constituting a single piece of work."' Additionally, the Court of
Appeals agreed with the District Court's holding that the work was not "applied art"
which would preclude it from protection under VARA." 9 The Second Circuit said
that interpreting applied art to include parts of a work that are affixed to a floor, wall
or ceiling (as utilitarian objects) would render
meaningless VARA's protection for
220
works of visual art installed in buildings.
The Court of Appeals, however, did not agree with the District Court's
determination of the relevant facts in accordance with the Reid tests. As a result, the
Second Circuit proceeded to review, de novo, the ultimate legal conclusion as to
whether or not the sculpture was a "work for hire" and found some of the lower
court's factual conclusions clearly erroneous." The court noted that the district court
2
properly applied the five relevant factors set out by this Circuit in Aymes.?
Nevertheless, it determined that the district court had misweighed some of these
factors in light of the circumstances of the case.' The court said that the district court
correctly found: (1) the evidence supports the finding that the plaintiffs controlled the
work's "manner and means," and (2) the artists' conception and execution of the work
required great skill in execution.224 The court concluded that this indicated that the
plaintiffs could have been independent contractors. 5 However, the court of appeals
said that the district court erred in its evaluation of the three remaining factors.
The court said that the parties' contract itself stipulated that the artists agreed "not
only to install the sculpture but also to 'render such other related services and duties
as may be assigned to [them] from time to time by the Company.2 2 6 Thus, the court
found that the defendants had the right to assign plaintiffs work other than the principle
218. Id. at 83- 84.
219. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, 71 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 1995) cert denied 64 U.S.L.W.
2372,37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020.
220. Id. (referringto 17 U.S.C. §113 which states in a relevant part:
(dXl) In a case in which (A) a work of visual art has been incorporated in or made part of a building in such
a way that removing the work from the building will cause the destruction, distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of the work as described in section 106A(aX3) ...
then the rights conferred by paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 106A(a) shall not
apply).
221. Carter,71 F.3d at 85.
222. Id. at 86. The five factors include: (1) the right to control the manner and means of
production; (2) the requisite skill; (3) provision of employee benefits; (4) tax treatment of the
hired party, and (5)
whether the hired party may be assigned additional projects. Id. See supra
text accompanying note 170.
223. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, 71 F.3d 77, 86 -87 (2d Cir. 1995) cert denied 64 U.S.L.W.
2372,37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020.
224. Id. at 86.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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sculpture.2 7 Additionally, the court determined that there was evidence that the
defendants exercised this right The court found that on at least three different
occasions the plaintiffs were assigned additional projects which they completed
without further compensation, supporting the defendants' position that the plaintiffs
were employees.
Next the court looked to the fourth and fifth factors.' Noting that the defendants
paid payroll and social security taxes, provided employee benefits such as life, health,
and liability insurance and paid vacations, as well as contributed to unemployment
insurance and workers' compensation funds on the plaintiff's behalf, the court found
that these factors also weighed in favor of employee status.3 Moreover, the court
noted (1) that two of the three artists filed for unemployment benefits after their
positions were terminated -- listing the building's management company as their
former employer, (2) that each plaintiff was paid a weekly salary, and (3) that the
plaintiffs had agreed that they would work principally for the defendants for the
duration of their agreement on a 40-hour per week basis. 1 The court went on to
examine otherReid factors and found that the artists were provided with many (if not
most) of the supplies used to create the sculpture. 3 2 The court also found that the
artists were employed for a substantial period of time -- their work continued for over
two years with no set date of termination, and that they could not hire paid assistants
without the defendants' approval.3 All of these factors combined, asserted the court,
weighed heavily in favor of the defendants' position that the plaintiffs were employees
and not independent contractors. In reaching this conclusion, the court declined to rule
on the district court's interpretation of the plaintiffs' ownership of the copyright as a
"plus factor" in the balancing of the Reid and Aymes factors.3 4 The court said,
however, that even if it were to be weighed a "plus factor," it would not change the
outcome of this case. 35
As a result of its examination of the factors, the Second Circuit held that the artists
were employees of the defendant, and the sculpture was therefore a work made for hire
as a matter of law. 6 Accordingly, the work fell outside the scope of VARA's
protection and the injunction was vacated. 7

227. Id.
228. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, 71 F.3d 77, 86 (2d Cir. 1995) cert. denied 64 U.S.L.W.
2372,37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020.
229. Provision of employee benefits and the tax treatment of the plaintiffs.
230. Carter,71 F.3d at 86.
231. Id. at 86-87.
232. Id. at 87.
233. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, 71 F.3d 77, 87 (2d Cir. 1995) cert. denied 64 U.S.L.W.
2372,37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 88.
237. Id. The Supreme Court has since denied review of this case, saying that even if the
sculptors' retention of copyright ownership were to be considered, it would not change the
outcome of this case. 64 U.S.L.W. 44 d43.
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C. Impact
The primary hurdle in any copyright infringement case is the determination of
authorship. Since VARA can only be applied after authorship is determined, the
Second Circuit's decision in Carterdoes not directly change VARA's application. It
does, however, result in a powerful indirect effect on VARA. By expanding Reid's
interpretation of agency laws, the Second Circuit has limited the contractual
advantages VARA sought to provide to artists. VARA application will often be
preempted under the Second Circuit's interpretation of the work for hire doctrine,
thus, artists will be again left unprotected.
In enacting VARA, Congress intended (1) to protect the honor and reputations
of visual artists, (2) to preserve and protect the works of visual art themselves, (3) and
to provide a nationwide standard for the protection of moral rights." s Additionally,
"Congress wanted to encourage artists to create works of visual art, since the cultural
heritage of the nation can only be enhanced through the creation of such art."" The
scope of VARA is narrowly written to only include works of "visual art" (i.e.
irreplaceable works, such as paintings, drawings, prints, and sculptures).24 ° It was
carefully drawn in this way to balance the "inherently different goals of the artists and
"
the industry exploiting the art."24
' Thus, the Second Circuit's interpretations of the
work for hire doctrine seems to be frustrating the goals of VARA by tipping the scales
in favor of employers and taking away the limited advantages VARA provides visual
artists.
1. CopyrightOwnership as a "PlusFactor"
The issue of copyright ownership may be best determined by the parties, in
writing, at the outset of a commissioned project. 42 It is ironic, therefore, that the
Second Circuit paid so little attention to the artists' retention of the copyright of the
work at issue.243 Of course, copyright ownership is not one of the factors mentioned
in the Reid test for what constitutes a "work made for hire;" however, the principal
24
issue in Reid (as in most "work made for hire" cases) was who owned the copyright. 4
The court in Aymes felt that the absence of a formalized written agreement between
238. Iglendza, supranote 174 at 191 (citing 136 CoNG. REc. H8266-02, H8269 (daily ed.
Sept. 27, 1990) at 12608).
239. Id. (citingH.R.REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1990)).

240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Goldscheid supra note 2, at 557.
243. William I. Schwartz, Intellectual Property Court Watch, 2 No. 4 INTELL. PROP.
STRATEGIST 11, 12 (January 1996). The court declined to rule on whether the plaintiffs'
ownership of the copyright was a "plus factor" in the balancing of the factors, but did say that
even ifit were a "plus factor," it would not outweigh the other factors which favored the artists
as employees. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, 71 F.3d 77, 87 (2d Cir. 1995) cert. denied 64
U.S.L.W. 2372,37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020.
244. Schwartz supra note 243.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss1/5
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Aymes and Bonelli as to copyright ownership was of great significance.245 In Carter,
however, the court declined to even consider the written agreement.
The Second Circuit's refusal to consider the artists' retention of copyright in the
work as a "plus factor" brings to light the fundamental conflict in U.S. law between
its long-held notion of copyright ownership, and the more recently recognized
international concept of moral rights.246 Arguably, under VARA, the work for hire
provision operates as the basis of an inquiry into the very nature of the work itself, the
artist's relation to that work, and the types of action that can be taken by any party
other than the artist.247 The historic U.S. notion of copyright serves primarily to award
an established property interest -- namely, a copyright -- to one of two potential
248
claimants.
249
The moral rights extended under VARA benefit both the artist and society.
Under the Act, artists are protected through the provision of the rights of attribution
and integrity."0 Society, as a whole, benefits from the protection of artists and their
work because "artists play a very important role in capturing the essence of culture and
recording it for future generations."' 251 As a result of the Act, a "work of visual art"
is no longer viewed as an a ordinary piece of property under a traditional notion of2
property rights where ownership and economic control dictate the fate of the work. 1
Instead, an artist's work can be protected from any alterations or destruction even after
it leaves the artist's hands, because the work is a reflection of the artist's own
personality." The Second Circuit, however, seems to be clinging to the old notion of
copyright and property while ignoring the larger, social value of the work.
2. The Degree of Control
The Second Circuit, nevertheless, did base its decision on the Supreme Court's
decision in Reid. Thus, it appears that the Reid court's use of agency law to determine

245. Hyde & Hager supra note 56, at 712.
246. See, Recent Case, Copyright- VisualArtists Rights Act - Second CircuitHolds
Sculpture to be Unprotected 'Workfor Hire." - Carterv. Helmsley Spear,Inc., 71 F.3d 77
(2d Cir.1995), Petitionfor CerL Filed,64 US.L.W. 2371 (U.S. Feb. 29, 1996)(No. 951400), 109 HARV. L. REV. 2110,2114 (June, 1996); Iglendza supranote 174; Fraser supra
note 175; Gerstenblith supra note 179.
247. Recent Case supra note 239, at 2114. In its decision, the district court in Cartersaid
that "Under VARA, the 'work made for hire' analysis, is undertaken for a different purpose:
The hired party's employment status is analyzed to ascertain whether a work created by that
party may be considered a 'work of visual art.' As such, it is logical to consider copyright
ownership when the 'work made for hire' analysis is necessary in an action seeking protection
of a work of art under VARA." Carter,861 F.Supp 303,321-22.
248. Recent Case supra note 247, at 2113.
249. Iglendza, supra note 174 at 199 (citingH.R. REP. No. 514).
250. 17 U.S.C. §106A.
251. Iglendza, supra note 174 at 199 (citingH.R. REP. No. 514).
252. Iglendza, supra note 174 at 210.
253. Id.
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who is and is not an employee under the Copyright Act is in need of clarification. 4
One apparent difficulty in Reid is its willingness to accept a "degree of control"
analysis as one of its factors, despite its rejection of the "actual control" test.
Because "degree of control" is one of the factors under agency law, courts may
apply that factor alone without altering the law from the pre-Reidstatus." 5 Just as the
"actual control" test could easily slide into a "right to control" test, 6 the agency
evaluation could easily slide into a right to control test. 7 This use of the degree of
control over the details of the project can result in a blurring of the distinction between
the rejected "actual control" test and Reid's agency law test."3
The Second Circuit inay, in effect, be applying the same "actual control" test it
used in Aldon. Its inquiry could be seen as a shift from whether the artists were
independent contractors to whether they were independent enough. 9 This change,
as a result, removes the protection that the 1976 Act was intended to give to
commissioned
workers and circumvents the careful compromise that the Act intended
26
to embody. 0
3. An Alternative Approach
Many scholars assert that Reid's agency law approach is unsatisfactory and,
therefore, must be replaced with a more effective test.21 The prevailing view is that
the "formal, salaried employee test" of the Dumas court is the best, most definitive
approach to the work for hire doctrine. 262 The advantage of this "formal, salaried
employee test" is that it provides clear guidance in the application of the work for hire
doctrine.263 Instead of allowing ownership determinations to be made after the fact,
based on balancing the of factors under agency rules, the "formal, salaried" definition
ensures that a determination as to copyright ownership is made upon commencement
of the working relationship.2" Applying the work for hire doctrine only to formal
254. Mamie Deaton Lucas, Copyright,Independent Contractors,and the Work-For-Hire
Doctrine: Communilyfor Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 67 N.C. L. REv. 994, 1007 (April
1989).
255. Goldsheid supra note 2, at 572.
256. Following Aldon Accessories "actual control" test, the Seventh and Fourth Circuits
modified it, creating a "right to control" test. See, Evans v. Newton and Brunswick Beacon,
Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publishing Co. supra note 34.
257. Goldscheid supra note 2, at 512.
258. Id.
259. Tepper supra note 17, at 315.
260. Id.
261. See, Morris supra note 2, at 206-210; Covarrubias supra note 14, at 376-77; Duran
supra note 1, at 1099-105; Lucas, supra note 254, at 1006-08; Goldscheid supra note 2, at
572-75.
262. Goldscheid, supra note 2, at 557.
263. Id.
264. Covarrubias supra note 14, at 378 (citing Statement of Ralph Oman, Register of
Copyrights and Assistant Librarian for Copyright Services before the Subcommittee on Patents,
Copyright and Trademarks, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, September 20, 1989, 10 1st
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss1/5
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employees is purported to be simpler, more predictable, and closer to congressional
intent than applying the work for hire doctrine to agency law employees. 265 The
legislative history, however, is difficult to decipher. The volume of this history makes
it difficult to ascertain what the legislative intent was.'" It contains thirty studies, three
reports by the Register of Copyrights, four panel discussions (in committee print), six
subcommittee hearings, eighteen committee reports, and nineteen general revision
bills spanning a period of twenty years.6 7 Additionally, this history is often ambiguous,
268
making it possible to cite legislative history to support almost any proposition.
One proposed solution has been offered by Senator Thad Cochran, a long-time
proponent of artists rights, who introduced Senate bill 1253269 in an attempt to remedy
the definitional omissions of the 1976 act.270 The bill would make four changes in the
definition of works made for hire:
First, the bill makes it explicit that subsections (1) and (2) of § 101 of the 1976
Act are mutually exclusive. It then defines the term employee in § 101 as a "formal,
salaried employee."27 The third change would require written agreements for each
specially ordered or commissioned work thereby eliminating blanket work for hire

Cong., 1st Sess., Prepared Statement, at 3, 15).
265. Id.
266. Tepper supra note 17, at 314.
267. Id.
268. Id. CompareEaster Seal Society for Crippled Children and Adults of Louisiana, Inc.
v. Playboy Enterprises, 815 F.2d 323, 329-30 (5th Cir. 1987) (saying that agency approach is
somewhat supported by the house report), cert denied, 108 S.Ct. 1280 (1988) with Aldorl
Accessories Ltd. v. Speigel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 552 (2d. Cir.) (finding no indication that
Congress intended to change prior case law), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984). Both courts
relied on H.R. REP. No. 1476,94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CoDE CONG. &
ADMrN. NEWS 5659, 5736-37. TEPPER supra note 17, at 317, n.157.
269. S.1253, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. §101(1989) provides:
That Section 101 of Title 17, United States Code, is amended (1) by amending clause (1) and the first sentence of clause (2) of the
definition, "work made for hire" to read as follows:
(1) a work, other than a specially ordered or commissioned
work, prepared by a formal salaried employee within the scope
of his or her employment, or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a
contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture
or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplemental
work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as
answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if, with respect to each
such work, the parties expressly agree in a written instrument
signed by them before commencement of the work, that the
work shall be considered a work made for hired. Id.
270. The terms "employee" and "scope of employment" were not defined under the Act. 17
U.S.C. §101.
271. Again, this is the interpretation set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Dumas v.
Gommerman, see note 96 and accompanying text. This approach was rejected by the Supreme
Court in Reid, see note 145 and accompanying text.
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agreements. The final change would require the parties to agree in a written
instrument, before commencement of the work, that the work would be a work for
hire.272 Thus, its definition of a work for hire in the amended §101 would refer to "a
work, other than a specially ordered or commissioned work, prepared by a formal
salaried employee within the scope of his or her employment."273 This language would
eliminate the possibility that an author or artist, hired on a project-by-project basis,
could be considered an employee, and thus be forced to relinquish ownership of his
creative work. 4 Such an approach could offer a more "objective, predictable
standard, giving clear guidance to the courts and parties involved in creating and
disseminating copyrightable works."275
4. The Futureof Employers and Artists
The Carterdecision has the potential to directly impact employers and artists. By
expanding theReidboundaries of the 'work for hire' provision, the Second Circuit not
only places the work of the 'Three-J's' injeopardy but, if followed by later courts, also
effectively threatens to withhold Congress's grant of moral rights from a large class
of visual artists whom Congress presumably intended to be among VARA's primary
beneficiaries. 6 Employers are given the advantage by the Second Circuit's decisions
inAymes and Carter.They are given clear guidance how to design contracts that will
establish artists as employees. Following the Aymes analysis, an employer can (1)
make sure it retains the right to control the manner and means of creation; (2) provide
various employee benefits, including unemployment and health insurance; (3) ensure
that tax is withdrawn from the artist's pay; and (4) make sure it retains the right to
assign additional projects. 7 While some of these factors would appear to be to the
advantage of the artist, especially the provision of insurance benefits, they actually
serve to deny the artist's rights to the copyright. The court's interpretation of the
provision of benefits as an indication of an employer/employee relationship serves as
a disincentive for artists to seek these basic life necessities. By weighing these
benefits against them, the courts are effectively denying artists these rights.
In the long run, artists will be the losers.27 Employers who can afford expensive
art can also afford expensive lawyers who will see to it that no art is installed unless
the artist has signed a waiver of the rights provided by VARA.279 As the "little guy,"
artists already have a contractual disadvantage in negotiating with big time

272. Duran supra note 1, at 1104-105 (citingS. 1253, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989)).
273. Goldsheid supra note 2, at 577 (citingS. 1253, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989)).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Recent Case supra note 247, at 2115.
277. See, Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857 (2nd Cir. 1992).
278. Thomas F. Bemer, Bad Laws Make Hard Cases, Wednesday, March 29, 1995,
N.Y.L.J. Vol. 213, No. 59, col. 3.
279. Id. A waiver of one's rights under 17 U.S.C. §106A places the artist at pre-VARA
status where his or her rights cease with an artwork's sale. Id.
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corporations.' The ad-hoc agency evaluation and the Second Circuit's interpretation
seems to further disadvantage artists because even those artists who have negotiated
to retain copyright ownership of their work can be deemed employees. The Carter
decision serves as a tangible reminder that artists are subject to market forces and a
corporate will which effectively forces them to either waive VARA rights, or forego
commission. '
HIl. CONCLUSION

Because the determination of who can claim authorship to a particular work
determines what rights that author is able to claim in relation to that work, the work
for hire doctrine becomes central to this inquiry. Since the Copyright Act of 1976, the
Circuits have struggled to interpret its the ambiguous language. In Reid, the Supreme
Court attempted to resolve the Circuits' division by delineating factors which would
provide the courts with a basis to examine the circumstances of a case. The cases that
have followed Reid have outlined additional factors or provided emphasis to a few
"universal" ones. By enacting VARA, Congress attempted to provide courts with an
alternative work for hire interpretation which would protect visual artists. Carter
demonstrates, however, that the determination of authorship under VARA and the
work for hire doctrine is still confused and ill defined. Since the courts have proven
themselves unable to resolve this dilemma, Congress needs to amend the definition of
a "work made for hire" under §101 of the Copyright Act, either as proposed by
Senator Cochran or in some similar fashion, if the "true" author of the work is to be
protected, and the contractual hardships faced by artists under the present
interpretation are to be avoided.

Shannon M. Nolley

280. Median earnings for salaried visual artists who usually work ful time were about
$23,000 a year in 1992. The middle 50 percent earned between $17,600 and S30,800 a year.
The top 10 percent earned more than $43,500, and the bottom 10 percent earned less than
S14,600. Earnings for self-employed visual artists vary widely. Those struggling to gain
experience and a reputation may be forced to charge what amount to less than the minimum
wage for their work. http://peter.itse.state.md.us:8 l/oohlvisuale.htm.
281. Berner supra note 278.
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